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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
MOUNTAIN FUEL SUPPLY 
COMPANY, 
Petitioner, 
PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION 
OF UTAH, 
Respondent. 
Case No. 910051 
(Priority Category 10) 
REPLY BRIEF OF PETITIONER 
MOUNTAIN FUEL SUPPLY COMPANY 
On December 16, 1991, Respondent Public Service Commission of Utah 
(the PSC or the Commission) and Interveners, the Utah Division of Public Utili-
ties (the Division) and the Utah Committee of Consumer Services (the Committee) 
filed a joint brief in this proceeding.1 Mountain Fuel Supply Company (Moun-
tain Fuel) respectfully submits its reply brief to respond to issues and arguments 
raised in the joint brief. 
I. TEST-YEAR ISSUES 
Respondents have briefly raised several issues relative to the Commission's 
because the respondent PSC and the two intervenor agencies have filed a 
single joint brief, this Reply Brief will refer to the three agencies collectively as 
"Respondents" and to their responsive brief as "Respondents' Brief." 
decision to employ an unadjusted 1989 test year to determine Mountain Fuel's 
1991 rates (Respondents' Brief 7-12), but none of the discussion addresses the 
fundamental issue: Did the Commission's actions imposing an unadjusted 1989 
test year "allow for reasonably anticipated changes in revenues, expenses, or other 
conditions in order that the test-period results of operations will be as nearly 
representative of future conditions as possible"? Department of Business Regula-
tions v. PSC, 614 P.2d 1242. 1248 (Utah 1980). Respondents have concentrated 
on whether Mountain Fuel made a "proffer" of evidence, whether the issue is 
moot, and whether the rate of inflation justified the PSC actions. 
A. The "Proffer Argument" 
The Respondents' first defense is that Mountain Fuel did not make a 
"proffer of the potential difference in rates" that a choice of test year would 
make. (Respondents' Brief at 7-8.) At best, this argument is of the form-over-
substance variety; more fundamentally, it mischaracterizes the preliminary pro-
ceedings and imposes on a utility seeking rate relief an impossible standard of 
evidentiary prescience that has no basis in law. 
Mountain Fuel made a direct proffer of the type of evidence and presenta-
tion that it wished to submit to the Commission. At the November 21, 1989, 
prehearing (and prefiling) conference that the Commission had scheduled for oral 
argument on the subject of the test year, Mountain Fuel outlined in detail the 
information that it wished to present and the reasons for so doing. (R. 7-9, Vol. 
I.) Although Mountain Fuel stated its belief that a future-looking test period 
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would better model the "rate-effective period," it offered to submit a full range of 
information on both historical and future periods. 
It is important to review briefly the sequence of events that led to this 
proposal. As outlined in its Initial Brief (at pages 4-7), Mountain Fuel was sum-
moned by the PSC to make a rate filing. At the first prehearing/prefiling confer-
ence held by the PSC, the Commission declared that it intended to determine rates 
for the future period beginning late 1990 and extending into 1991 on the basis of a 
historic test year—the year 1989. Although the Company argued that it should be 
allowed to present such evidence as it thought would carry its PSC-imposed 
burden to establish rates for the future period—namely, information about a future 
test year—the Company offered to file both sets of data and information in order 
to accommodate both the Commission's mandate for historical test-year informa-
tion and to present the Company's own case. (R. 6-9, Vol. I.) 
The Commission's response was flatly to refuse this proffer. (R. 37, Vol. 
I.) It now comes before the Court to claim that this case should be dismissed 
because Mountain Fuel did not lay out the precise difference in the rates that the 
two different underlying approaches would produce. But this information that 
would have shown these differences is exactly the dual filing Mountain Fuel was 
prepared to make. The Commission can't really believe that the absence of a 
showing that it prohibited in the first instance constitutes a reasonable justification 
for denying Mountain Fuel its day in court on this fundamental issue. 
The PSC did not hesitate in denying Mountain Fuel the right to make the 
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future-test-year presentation that the Company believed was appropriate to estab-
lish just and reasonable rates. The Commission now comes to this Court and 
bases its defense on the theory that Mountain Fuel—in the face of the Commis-
sion's unequivocal proscription of submitting future test-year data—should have 
nonetheless been prepared at the prefiling conference to state the effects of two 
full-scale rate-case presentations for the sole purpose of making a "proffer." 
The evidence rule cited in Respondents' Brief reads, in relevant part: 
Error may not be predicated upon a ruling which admits or excludes 
evidence unless a substantial right of the party is affected, and . . . 
[i]n case the ruling is one of excluding evidence, the substance of the 
evidence was made known to the court by the offer or was apparent 
from the context within which questions were asked. 
Utah R. Evid. 103(a)(2) (emphasis added). Mountain Fuel is at a loss to under-
stand how its unequivocally stated position and detailed description of the filing it 
proposed to make would not pass this test. Mountain Fuel outlined plainly the 
"substance of the evidence" for the Commission. Rule 103(a)(2) does not require 
more. 
In addition, Respondents' reliance on the technical application of a rule of 
questionable relevance is all the more puzzling in view of the Commission's own 
rules: "The Commission is not bound by the technical rules of evidence and may 
receive any oral or documentary evidence . . . ." Utah Admin. Code § R750-
100-9(A)(6)(a) (1991).2 Apart from the fact that Mountain Fuel's proffer is in 
2In addition, the Utah Administrative Procedures Act, Utah Code Ann. 
(continued...) 
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fall compliance with Rule 103(a)(2), the Commission's selective invocation of the 
Rules of Evidence is not consistent with its own rules, the Utah Administrative 
Procedures Act, nor the character of rate-making as a legislative function.3 
Respondents' "proffer argument" has no merit. It would impose a prefiling 
performance standard on the utility that has no legal or equitable foundation. Re-
spondents' defense attempts to sidestep and obscure the real issue: Did the Com-
mission carry out its responsibility to receive and evaluate such evidence as would 
allow it to determine just and reasonable rates for a period beginning in December 
1990 and continuing into 1991? A straightforward review of the record shows it 
did not. 
B. The Mootness Issue 
In its second argument, Respondents (at pages 8-9) claim that the Company 
hasn't asked for the application of a specific test year and that, therefore, the issue 
is moot. This argument would parlay the somewhat peculiar mechanics of utility 
ratemaking into an administrative maze from which the utility could never escape. 
Mountain Fuel's restraint in limiting its request for relief to something less 
than a full remand and reconstruction of a 1990 rate proceeding does not render 
2(... continued) 
§§ 63-46b-l through -22 (1989 & Supp. 1991) appears not to contemplate auto-
matic imposition of the Utah Rules of Evidence on administrative agencies. See, 
e.g., § 63-46b-8, which explicitly cites incorporation of one of the Rules of Evi-
dence (on judicial notice) and implicitly rejects another (on hearsay testimony). 
3See, e.g., Arizona Grocery Co. v. Atchison, T. & S.F. Ry. Co., 284 U.S. 
370, 389 (1932); Department of Business Regulations v. PSC, 614 P.2d 1242, 
1250 (Utah 1980). 
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the issue before the Court as moot. The Commission's prohibition of the parties' 
submitting relevant evidence and its failure to correlate the data for the 1989 test 
year with the rate-effective period (beginning December 1990) are unlawful acts, 
and Mountain Fuel should be afforded relief from these actions. 
Although Mountain Fuel might have chosen to seek a full remand of the 
case from the Court to the PSC with instructions to redetermine rates based on a 
recreation of the evidence that would have been presented in 1990, the Company 
instead chose the far more practical course of seeking to file new information that 
would set prospective rates under the auspices of this Court's disposition of the 
issues raised in this case. This recognizes the reality that life must go on for both 
the utility company and its customers, as well as the difficulty of obtaining a stay 
of a Commission rate order while matters are under review before this Court.4 
Respondents characterize this as seeking no remedy. Although Mountain 
Fuel has not sought the remedy that the Respondents might have expected, there is 
nonetheless a real grievance that requires a remedy: To avoid the very problem 
that the Respondents use as a foundation for their argument—that "[t]he forecast-
ed test period Mountain Fuel wanted . . . no longer exists"—the Company has 
sought the remedy of refiling a new case with explicit instructions from this Court 
that such a case is to be evaluated on the basis of determining as accurately as 
^his is apparently a very high hurdle, as perhaps illustrated by this Court's 
recent denial of a request for a rate-order stay by US West. US West Communi-
cation, Inc. v. PSC, No. 910408 (Utah, Nov. 8, 1991). 
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possible the conditions that will exist while the rates will be effective. Mountain 
Fuel's choice not to seek a complete remand to reconstruct a 1990 rate proceeding 
with a proper evaluation of the test period does not render the issue moot. 
But, even if the issue were technically moot, this is precisely the type of 
situation that is entitled to judicial review because it is likely to recur and will 
otherwise escape judicial review. As Respondents have correctly pointed out, this 
Court has addressed the issue in Wickham v. Fisher, 629 P.2d 896 (Utah 1989). 
The criteria cited there are satisfied in Mountain Fuel's case. The test-year issue 
"is of wide concern, affects the public interest, is likely to recur in a similar 
manner, and . . . would otherwise likely escape judicial review." Id. at 899. 
A Commission declaration on page 7 of the November 21, 1990, order 
nearly guarantees that there will be a recurrence of the problems raised in this 
case, with the same difficulty in bringing the matter to this court in a timely 
fashion: 
In future proceedings, the Commission will decide issues concerning 
test year, rate base, out-of-period adjustments, and related matters, 
prior to the onset of hearings and based on the then existing condi-
tions of the utility and the economy in which it is operating. 
(R. 1969.) Apparently, the Commission feels very strongly that it should continue 
to make factual determinations without the benefit of taking evidence on these 
matters ("prior to the onset of hearings"). This proclamation directly establishes 
the likely-to-recur criterion of Wickham. 
Surely, it is not sensible public policy to permit the Commission to avoid 
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judicial scrutiny of an unlawful act simply because of the inherent nature of the 
utility ratemaking process. 
Also, Respondents' suggestion that the Company should have taken an 
interlocutory appeal (at pages 9-10 n.10) overlooks the likelihood that there was, 
at that time, no justiciable issue. An interlocutory appeal in November 1989, 
when the Commission denied the parties the right to submit future-test-year evi-
dence, would likely have been rejected for lack of a demonstrable, irreparable 
injury. At the time of the Commission's action, there was still Ihe possibility that 
it would permit such modifications, changes and post-test-year adjustments to the 
historical 1989 test year that the resultant rates could have passed the minimal 
legal tests for being just and reasonable for the 1991 period. With appropriate 
adjustments, Mountain Fuel might well not have been aggrieved, notwithstanding 
the rejection of a full future test year. Such a determination wasn't possible until 
a final order was issued on November 21, 1990. Apart from the nearly impossi-
ble timing problems created by taking an interlocutory appeal,5 it also seems 
probable that the Commission itself would have opposed such a procedure. 
In a short, the test-year issue was not ripe on November 21, 1989. See, 
5In order to get to this Court, Mountain Fuel would have first had to file a 
request for rehearing with the Commission; the Commission v/ould have had to 
deny the rehearing; and the parties would presumably file briefs and argue the 
issue before this honorable Court while the business of determining rates would be 
"on hold." Would the Commission, who initiated the rate proceedings, have 
supported such a judicial interlude? 
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e.g., Redwood Gym v. County Commission, 624 P.2d 1138, 1148 (Utah 1981).6 
It only became justiciable when the Commission issued its final order on Novem-
ber 21, 1990, declaring that it would reject all post-test-year adjustments and 
failing to make any finding that the unadjusted 1989 test year was reasonably 
related to the period when rates would be effective. 
C. The "Inflation Defense" 
At pages 10-11 of their brief, Respondents attempt to justify the use of 
unadjusted 1989 data by claiming that "the Commission took into account eco-
nomic circumstances." Apparently as a predicate to this claim, Respondents argue 
(page 10) that the imposition of a historical test year was in some way justified 
because the Commission initiated the proceeding by summoning the Company and 
requiring it to undertake the burden of proof in establishing its rates. (R. 2221, 
2238.) The claim that the Commission "wanted to learn . . . whether or not a 
rate reduction might be justified" is not only irrelevant to the statutory respon-
sibilities of the Commission under Utah Code Ann. §§ 54-3-1 and 54-4-4 (1990), 
but it is an after-the-fact construct that was not a part of the Commission's final 
order in the case. 
Even it if were relevant to the issue of a proper test year, the Respondents' 
citation to pages 3-7 of the Commission's final order (at page 10) is inaccurate. 
6See also, e.g., Papago Tribal Utility Authority v. FERC, 628 F.2d 235 (D.C. 
Cir. 1980), and cases cited in that opinion discussing the ripeness doctrine for 
agency actions, as developed in the federal courts. 
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There is no discussion in that order of the Commission's focus on "whether or not 
a rate reduction might be justified." In any event, none of this is relevant to the 
way in which this case went forward and the Commission's responsibilities to 
determine lawful rates. The Commission "invited" the Company to submit a fil-
ing for the determination of future rates; it imposed the burden of proof on the 
Company to establish the rates; the Company sought to present evidence it thought 
would model the period when rates would be effective; the Commission refused to 
entertain such a presentation (and ultimately denied other proposed adjustments to 
the 1989 historic period); pursuant to the Commission's evidentiary limitations, 
the Company sought a rate increase under Utah Code Ann. § 54-4-4. 
The Commission was not thereby relieved of its obligation to determine 
rates in accordance with the law—applicable statutes, constitutional principles and 
the prior decisions of this Court. 
The Respondents' Brief goes on to argue (page 11) that the state of inflation 
in the U. S. economy justified the exclusion of post-1989 evidence. As pointed 
out in Mountain Fuel's Initial Brief (pages 30-31), there wasn't any evidence to 
justify this conclusion. The only support cited in Respondents' Brief for this 
assertion and conclusion is that uthe Commission took administrative notice of the 
fact that the rate of inflation had been consistently low for quite some time." 
(Respondents' Brief at 11.) 
First, neither the Commission nor any party identified any document or any 
data or other information of which "administrative notice" was to be taken. 
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Counsel for the Committee asked the Commission to take "official notice of the 
inflation rate during the last five years," without specifying or identifying what he 
was talking about or referring to. (R. 39.) Commissioner Stewart indicated "the 
Commission will do so," but there was never any identification of what informa-
tion was under discussion. This can hardly be considered an evidentiary founda-
tion for Commission action that is required to pass UAPA muster. 
Beyond this evidentiary problem, Commission has repeatedly relied on the 
following logic, restated in its brief (pages 11-12): (a) If general levels of infla-
tion in the United States are lower than they were in the 1970s and early 1980s, 
there is no need to use a forward-looking or adjusted test year, (b) Current 
inflation rates are lower than those of the 1970s and early 1980s, (c) Therefore, 
the Commission needn't consider evidence of conditions that will exist during the 
rate-effective period. 
This reasoning is so defective that any reliance on it surely breaches the 
arbitrary-and-capricious standard of the Utah Administrative Procedures Act, Utah 
Code Ann. § 63-46b-16(4)(h)(iv) (1989). At best, the Commission confuses 
necessary with sufficient conditions for examining a question of this kind. High 
inflation rates, standing alone, may well be a sufficient condition for considering 
forward-looking evidence; but they are surely not a necessary condition. That is, 
there are a host of elements that enter the ratemaking exercise that can change 
materially over time, such that the failure to account for them will not produce 
rates that, as accurately as possible, model the period when rates will be effec-
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tive.7 Inflation is only one such factor. 
Even if inflation were the one critical element, the Commission's reasoning 
doesn't pass rudimentary muster. No one in this proceeding, including the Com-
mission, has postulated a zero-inflation period. The only real record evidence is 
that of Mr. Robinson (R. 2279), which shows that there has been at significant 
level of inflation that may have a material effect on business operations. 
If these levels in some way negated or nullified the necessity to determine 
conditions during the rate-effective period, the Commission never articulated why 
this was so. As discussed in Mountain Fuel's Initial Brief, there was no evidence 
to link—one way or the other—the existing inflation rates with the stability of 
costs, revenues, rates or any other ratemaking element.8 
Finally, the very existence of any inflation suggests the possibility of dy-
namic relationships among the elements that go into the ratemaking equation. Any 
reasonable attempt to comport with the Department of Business Regulations guide-
Tor example, the size of the company's plant investment, its customer base, 
the average usage level of the customers, the addition or loss of major industrial 
users, the capital structure of the company, the cost of materials and supplies. 
8It is difficult to take seriously the claim in Respondents' Brief (at page 11): 
"Clearly, if economic conditions had been as volatile as they were for example in 
the mid-1970s and early 1980s, and Mountain Fuel had so argued, the Commis-
sion would have allowed the submission of the forecasted test period." There is 
no basis for it; no witness ever addressed the subject; the Commission's order did 
not address this point. Respondents offer no clue about what would be the magic 
level of "economic volatility" that would automatically trigger the use of forward-
looking information, nor—more importantly—why a condition of economic 
volatility is necessary before the Commission is required to consider evidence of 
the utility's operations during the rate-effective period. 
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lines (ttas nearly representative of future operations as possible") must look past a 
historic year that is near!) two years removed from the rate-effective period. 
• i: > I Hah Code Ann. § 54-4-4(3) 
Two Respondents argue (at pages 11-12) that Utah Code Ann. § 54-4-4(3) 
(1990) permits the Commission to reject evidence about the Company's operations 
dining the i*11 n*l ill! hmr vi, linn ules will Ix in effort 9 Mie statute statt s ."*-" 
The commission, in its determination of just and reasonable 
rates, may consider recent changes in the utility's financial condition 
or changes reasonably expected but not speculative, in the utility's 
revenues, expenses or investments and may adopt an appropriate fu-
ture test period, not exceeding twelve months from the date of the 
filing, including projections or projections together with a period of 
actual operations in determining the utility's test year for ratemaking 
purposes. 
Respondents rely or *u~ phrase "may adopt" t~ give the Commission 
license to svveep aw in, th .]iiirenients • > • .:- - '.-.^on-
making and the fundamental goal of utility ratemaking—namely, to set rates for a 
future period. This is not a rational interpretation of the statute in light of the 
nlhei IIK' qii 11"(.' ill it ills (luil i (iitiiiiissioui iii, turns must satisfy. 
Respondents' Brief has attempted to paint Mountain Fuel's position on this 
issue as requiring the use of a specific future test yeai As the Company made 
|N"i1eill\ ekvt! HI mul argument before tl le Commission (K /" l)l Vol I) and in its 
Initial Brief (at page 10 n.5), it recognizes there may In ition Ihan one \ui\ to 
9The Committee of Consumer Services declined to support this statutory argu-
ment. (Respondents' Brief at 11 n.14.) 
arrive at lawful results. But, in all events, there must be some logical connection 
between the chosen 1989 test year and the period when rates were to be effective. 
In this case, the Commission never made such a connection. It has accordingly 
not carried out the legal responsibility that the Commission itself identified as the 
fundamental goal: "to provide . . . information that reasonably approximates 
circumstances expected during the period rates will be in effect." (R. 1968.) 
Contrary to the implication in Respondents' Brief, § 54-4-4(3) does not 
override the otherwise applicable standards to which the Commission must adhere: 
the general guideline stated in Department of Business Regulations, the UAPA's 
proscription of arbitrary and capricious action, and the necessity to provide proper 
findings to support ultimate conclusions, as required by this Court. See, e.g., 
Milne Truck Lines, Inc. v. PSC, 720 P.2d 1373, 1378 (Utah 1986).10 
Finally, Mountain Fuel is reluctant to get involved in a contest of unsup-
ported claims about the motives of the Utah Legislature in enacting the fiiture-test-
year language in § 54-4-4(3), but it must take issue with the characterization in 
footnote 15 of Respondents' Brief. That the statute allows the utilities and Com-
mission to deal with periods of high inflation does not imply anything about low 
or medium inflation or any other conditions that might exist.11 Indeed, 
10Although this is a pre-UAPA case, the principles of agency accountability 
that are discussed are at least as strongly applicable under the UAPA as under 
former agency-review standards. See Vali Convalescent and Care Institutions v. 
Division of Health Care Financing, 797 P.2d 438, 443 n.6 (Utah App. 1990). 
nEven in a declining price environment, a future test year would better match 
rates with the rate-effective period and provide lower rates, in general. 
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M.uinlwn liu'1 "• ircollcdiMii of (he reason lor (In." i«tluitj test >eai' language was to 
eliminate any uncertainty about the Commission's authority to consider a future 
test year. 
Rate-base Issue 
The Respondents dedicate the plurality of their argument (pages 13-23 
the secondary issue of a proper rate base for Mountain Fuel—year-end versus 
average-year rate base. But they have attacked and apparently defeated a "straw 
man." Had Mountain Fuel an'on) llihil \ear riul mile base is rilhei as ,t iii.Hli i 
of law or uniform application of fundamental ratemaking principles—always the 
proper measure of the utility investment, Respondents' arguments might be rele-
\ ai it. 
However, as indicated in its Initial Brief (at 32-38), Mountain Fuel has 
sought the Court's review of the rate-base issue in the context of the Commis-
sion's failure HI satisf> llic lawful requirement of deriving and approving rates that 
properly reflect conditions during tl ic rate-effective |vnod This is mil) ntc of \i\ 
connected arguments discussing the absence of evidence establishing the Commis-
sion's unadjusted 1989 test year complete with mid-year rate base, as the best 
representative of the > 
Contrary to Respondents' attempt to characterize this as an independent 
issue to be viewed in the context of isolated evidence about rate base, Mountain 
I iiicl lilts alriMils i oiicalal (IM( illn'in1 iiiiin, In1 instances where the use of an aver-
age-year rate base might be perfectly proper (Initial Brief at 35 n.25). 
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In addition, the Respondents make a major issue out of Mountain Fuel's 
failure to discuss certain parts of the record that involve the rate base. This 
argument misunderstands or misstates the gravamen of Mountain Fuel's argument: 
There is a total absence of evidence to show that average rate base, vis-a-vis year-
end rate base, more closely approximates conditions that will exist during the rate-
effective period. 
Respondents' claims about Mountain Fuel's failure to "marshall the evi-
dence" (pages 14-19) contort the holding in First National Bank of Boston v. 
County Board of Equalization, 799 P.2d 1163, 1165 (Utah 1990). This case does 
not stand for the proposition that appellant must marshall evidence that is not 
relevant to the fundamental issue before the Court. If Respondents wish to bring 
it to the Court's attention to establish a different point, they may, of course, do 
so. But, Mountain Fuel's failure to make Respondents' arguments for them is not 
a deviation from Bank of Boston}1 
Further, the Initial Brief's arguments are aimed directly at the discussion of 
the rate-base issue in the Commission's final order. (R. 1969-71.13) Notwith-
standing Respondents' multiple after-the-fact citations to the evidentiary record, 
12Nor is it a violation of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure 11(e)(2), as 
Respondents claim (page 14). See the discussion in § F, infra. 
^Respondents' Brief cites pages 3-10 of the Commission's November 21, 
1990, order (miscited as "R. 1956-72") as the place where "the Commission gave 
the . . . reasons for its decision to use the average rather than the year-end rate 
base." The only discussion of the rate-base issue is contained in just over a page 
of discussion running from page 7 to page 9. 
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Mountain Fuel understood the foundation for the PSC's choice of rate base to be 
recited at pages 7 9 of its final order where the Commission gave three reasons to 
justify its use of the average-yeai rate base 14 
Mountain Fuel 's Initial Brief (pages 34-38) discussed each and showed why 
they singly and collectively do not satisfy the criteria for establishing just and 
l e a s o u a b i e r r i h s .. . .' , , • . • •. ; • •
 ;.: •- ; , - • .^  .• , 
The Company and this Court must assume that the reasoning and the evi-
dence cited in the PSC's orders form the foundation for its conclusions. If this is 
mil the east., llicii ijliiinh.! In <lt limlioii (In t i niimi ISIOII ha1- a i l ed i i ln l ra r ih 
and capriciously and, at the very least, has not satisfied the requirements of Milne 
and D and H Real Estate Co, i PSC, 7 8 4 P.2d 158, 159 (Utah 1989) . 
In this regard, m \r*f "reason" cited in the Respondents' Brief to support 
•"•** inflation rales were low HIKI Mounliiiii hiiel's. Mies 
had been s table—does not even appear in the November 2 1 , 1990 , o rde r on rate 
base. Rather, this point is a part: of the order's d iscuss ion on choi.ce of test year 
.mil is muonik ' i led wild (In rale base ni l ionak ' . •. • • ••' ' •  '• ." .. . 
But, the fundamental point is not over the technical aspects of the coordi-
nation of rate base with test-year revenues and expenses , which is the focus of the 
Respondents Unci ll is v\hethei I l i n e is any evuli n te lo show IIMI llns I h o n e is 
14It is also notable that the Commiss ion did not address the rate-base issue in 
its order on rehearing. (R. 2 1 6 1 - 6 5 . ) This reaffirmed that the limited discussion 
of the issue on pages 7-9 of the November 2 1 , 1990 , order constituted the C o m -
mission's full rationale and consideration of the evidence on the issue. 
more likely to represent the level of Mountain Fuel's utility investment on which 
it is entitled to earn a fair rate of return than a method that pushes the measure-
ment back in time some six months. On this point, the only evidence is that the 
Company's rate base is increasing (R. 2425) and that, under the circumstances of 
this case, a year-end rate base would more accurately reflect actual conditions. 
(See discussion and citations in Initial Brief at 36-37.) Under conditions where an 
unadjusted 1989 test year has been imposed, failure to advance the time for the 
"rate-base snapshot" will short-change the utility. It will be denied a reasonable 
opportunity to earn a return on a portion of the property dedicated to providing 
utility service. 
F. Inapplicability of Rule 11(e)(2) 
At page 14, Respondents raise an issue about Mountain Fuel's augmentation 
of the portion of the record that was originally transmitted by the PSC, citing 
Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure 11(e)(2).15 Respondents' claims that Moun-
tain Fuel did not comply with this rule are puzzling. First, Rule 11(e)(2) appears 
under Title II of the Rules, "Appeals from Judgments and Orders of Trial Courts" 
and appears not to have been designed for agency cases. 
Second, Rules 15 and 16 are the directly applicable rules under Title III, 
"Review and Enforcement of Orders of Administrative Agencies, Commissions 
and Committees." Rule 16 requires the PSC to file "the entire record or such 
Respondents' Brief miscites this as Rule ll(3)(e)(2). 
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parts as the parties may designate by stipulation . . . .' When Mountain Fuel 
discovered that the Commission unilaterally filed only a portion of the record with 
Mir (muni ill "iiHighii in iiiipiiiiii'iiii iin iLiiiisiiiiiit'iJi iiiait'f liiii .uul in ak'ii \\w oilier 
parties to the problem, as reported in Appendix 3 of Respondents' Brief. This is 
the procedure contemplated by Rule 15(b). There is no provision in Title III of 
Kin1 rules Hi il impo- tvpp. requirements Presumably, the primary 
responsibility for the agency to transmit the entire1 re< .ml remo\os an\ pi obit'im 
of the type addressed by Rule u 
r
 Summary 
Respondent^ " '-• 'U'gmiK'iii n» ^ippnH die 
PSC exclusion of future-period data. The brief focuses on procedural matters (the 
"proffer issue/' the question of mootness, and the "evidence marshalling" argu-
ni.'nlI antI .mi llit L'pilh .uul hi* hulls unsupported claim that inflation levels 
justify its actions. 
A A
 10 point in their brief do the Respondents claim that there is evidence 
lli (u iiisi11 \ ilii piohibition on future-test-year information, or (2) to show that 
the unadjusted 1989 test year satisfi.es tin1 rcqiiiiviin nls nil Deparwwfu m business 
Regulations or otherwise to address the substantive issue of determining conditions 
during the rate-effective period. 
II. REDUCTION OF EQUITY I- I/I I i\ Ul< UK I URN '.-,. . 
A. Lack of Authority to Support a Penalty 
On the relevant evidence before it, the Commission stated, "[W]e find the 
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cost of equity to be 12.2%." (R. 1991.) It then proceeded to reduce this to 
12.1%. In Respondents' Brief, the focus on this issue is that, once the Com-
mission has specified some kind of "zone of reasonableness" for the return on 
equity, it has open-season license to choose any number within the range. 
Respondents' Brief (page 24) relies on its perception that "the Commission 
has broad discretion to set a utility's rate of return as long as it is within a range 
to reasonableness." The brief goes on to cite Utah Code Ann. § 54-3-1: 
The scope of definition "just and reasonable" may include, but shall 
not be limited to, the cost of providing service to each category of 
customer, economic impact of charges on each category of custom-
ers, and on the well being of the State of Utah; methods of reducing 
wide periodic variations in demand of such products, commodities of 
services, and means of encouraging conservation of resources and 
energy. 
Mountain Fuel does not see that this provision grants the Commission the freedom 
of action it claims. In particular, it doesn't even hint at the authority to penalize a 
utility because the Commission "take[s] issue with the management of the compa-
ny's parent." (R. 1992.) 
As this Court made perfectly clear in Kearns-Tribune Corp. v. PSC, 682 
P.2d 858, 859 (Utah 1984), the Commission has no inherent regulatory powers. 
Thus, even if there had been substantial evidence to support a claim of utility mis-
management or inefficiency, the Commission is not permitted to penalize the 
utility through the lowering of its otherwise properly determined return on equity. 
Here, however, the case is even stronger, because the Commission has 
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111i«in" iiio finding |1||l l(' oinpan »/ inefficiency HI niismanagoinenl IUl" Responds nls 
nevertheless argue (pages 27-29) that "[t]here is a compelling public policy reason 
for upholding the Commission in adjusting rate of return for either efficiency or 
managemen simply irrelevant in lb i ase before the Comi I ike-
wise, the several cases cited in the Respondents' Brief at pages 27-28 deal with 
rate-of-return reductions where inefficiency or mismanagement had been found. 
These cases are therefore not applicable to Mountain Fuel's situation. Further, 
even if there had been such evidence, there is ilo foundation—either statutory :>i 
evidentiary—that would support a reduction of the otherwise lawful rate of return 
determined by the Commission. (See Initial Brief at 42-45.) 
Kespoiiilnih ii,tu uited ttir "end rvsull' iliulfinr i I sin li cases a? ; f ftah 
Power and Light Co. v. PSC, 152 P.2d 542 (Utah 1944). This is still the law in 
Utah with respect to confiscation arguments, but it does not stand for the proposi-
ti mi lliuil no uwnpunonl o( Iln 11i«tiIi nl c u n t s IiMilinjt.1 I i Ihr nul lesiilll uni'i In 
subject to judicial scrutiny. In particular, Commission action must be viewed not 
only in connection with the Utah Power case, but in the context of the Utah 
Administrative Procedures Act, subsequent decisions of this Court, such as De-
partment of Business Regulations and Mil fundamentals ol it itilitj • i ale-
making that govern the procedures and substance of the determination of just and 
reasonable rates, as required by Utah Code Ann. § 54-4-4 and § 54-3-1. 
There were indications to the contrary, in fact. fp t 0 < ^ 1 0 : n ^ 
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The Commission does not have license to cloak otherwise unauthorized 
penalties in the mantle of the Utah Power case. 
B. Marshalling of Evidence 
On pages 29-30, Respondents rely on their perception of the "marshalling 
of evidence" language stated in Bank of Boston, 799 P.2d at 1165. Mountain Fuel 
does not dispute this requirement, but the Respondents miss the mark when they 
ascribe significance to the fact that Mountain Fuel did not designate various rate-
of-return and other evidence from the record in support of its arguments on the 
Commission's .1% penalty reduction.lJ 
The threshold question is, of course, what evidence is relevant to the issue 
the Company has raised. As indicated in its Initial Brief (page 39), Mountain 
Fuel has not taken legal issue with the establishment of 12.2% as the just and 
reasonable rate of return. Thus, all the evidence presented (a considerable vol-
ume) on the establishment of this equity return level is irrelevant to the issue 
before the Court—including Mountain Fuel's own rate-of-return evidence. 
Rather, the Company has raised the substantial-evidence issue in two forms: 
(1) There is no evidence that linked any action or failure of action of Mountain 
Fuel to a reduction in the equity rate of return to be permitted the Company; (2) 
similarly, there is no evidence that would quantify any such reduction. Respon-
17Much of the evidence passingly referred to in page 30 of Respondents' Brief 
was also not designated by any of the Respondents. See Appendix 3 of Respon-
dents' Brief. 
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4i!i(s RPH ipagc 2[)\ ncvdkM' MIMIHII n I - uc I •«« i ||( designating its own witness's 
rate of return testimony as the part of the record to be considered Bui it is 
perfectly obvious why: Professor Williamson—as with the other rate-of-return 
w itnrsst1^ did mil jildre1^ (ht question of i ate of return with respect to Company 
performance, mismanagement, efficiency or affiliate relation'i Why the Company 
should burden this Court with irrelevant rate-of-return evidence is unclear. 
Furthti Respondents' claims that Mountain Fuel did not marshall the 
evidence of various witnesses of the Division ,in.l "' . iimnl'lce roiuvrniny (hc f l^c-
of-return penalty is particularly puzzling. In the first place, under Rule 15(b) the 
Respondents were free to designate such evidence as they saw fil if it supported 
their position, rnmvrnmy snl'sl.inlwl ;,|» HIITI. O I'h.il llu/y i hoso nol in does 
not undercut Mountain Fuel's position that these witnesses' testimony was not 
relevant to the issue raised by the Company. Second, no rate-of-return witness 
addressed the MIIIJIM I IM I In « nniru ml \ pniali\ nr adjustment for affiliate transac-
tions or relations. 
Mountain Fuel and the Court can only evaluate the lawfulness of the PSC's 
hn.il niiiln h\ hiking the1 < ommissiou « words at face value On this issue, the 
Commission's order summarizes its reasoning thus: 
The record suggests, though without benefit of systematic examina-
tion, that Company management has performed very well in most 
respects. In two areas, however affiliate relationships and gas supply 
planning, we take issue with the management of the Company's par-
ent, Questar Corporation. 
(R. 1992, emphasis added.) 
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This is the foundation for the Commission's reduction of the rate of return, 
and Mountain Fuel believes that it is unlawful for the reasons given in its Initial 
Brief. By referring the Court to several places in the record, Respondents' Brief 
attempts to establish that there is a sufficient quantum of evidence to satisfy the 
substantial-evidence test of the UAPA. Mountain Fuel does not dispute that there 
were witnesses who speculated and expressed "concern" about the management of 
the corporate parent. But this speculation was never translated into any tangible 
effect on Mountain Fuel's utility service or rates. 
Even if the Commission had the authority to impose a rate-of-return penal-
ty, the test is whether the legitimate, lawful relationship between Mountain Fuel 
and its affiliates has a detrimental effect on the customers of Mountain Fuel. 
There are two levels of evidence that are required to justify any cost disallowance 
or rate reduction: There must be substantial evidence of (1) a tangible, identifi-
able connection between a professed "concern" and the quality of service or the 
rates charged for the service, and (2) the measure of the connection between the 
disapproved behavior and the rate reduction (the penalty). 
None of the evidence cited in Respondents' Brief establishes these connec-
tions. Was there testimony that one or more witnesses disapproved of the corpo-
rate structure under which Mountain Fuel operates? Yes. Was there speculation 
that this might have an effect Mountain Fuel's operations? Yes. Does this specu-
lation demonstrate in any way that the utility services rendered by Mountain Fuel 
and the rates it charges were detrimentally affected? No. Was there any evidence 
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to measure the alleged adverse effect implied by the Commission? No. 
A careful reading of the record shows that any general dissatisfaction with 
the operating structure of Mountain Fuel and its parent was not translated into any 
tangible measure of customer detriment. There is, therefore, no reason—no sub-
stantial evidence—to justify a reduction in the Company's rates by lowering its 
rate of return. 
Plainly and simply, the Commission's adjustment to the Company's rate of 
return was a penalty that is unsupported by the evidence and unsupported by any 
grant of authority from the Utah Legislature. 
III. CONCLUSION 
For the reasons stated above and in its Initial Brief, Mountain Fuel Supply 
Company reasserts its request for relief from this Court, as set forth in its Initial 
Brief. 
Respectfully submitted, 
MOUNTAIN FUEL SUPPLY COMPANY 
G^y G.(£adkett, 
Associate General Counsel 
Questar Corporation 
Counsel for 
Mountain Fuel Supply Company, 
January 30, 1992 a Questar Corporation subsidiary 
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